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Abstract 
We develop a model of horizontally differentiated oligopolies with network externalities 
and reconsider a Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite entry, a problem previously 
examined by Economides (1996) and Kim (2002). We demonstrate that a Stackelberg 
leader has (does not have) an incentive to invite entry if the degree of network 
externalities is larger (smaller) than that of the product substitutability, such that a 
follower’s profit increases (decreases).  
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In a seminal paper, Economides (1996) considered a Stackelberg competition in a 
homogeneous product market with network externalities and demonstrated that an 
incumbent (the Stackelberg leader) has an incentive to invite new entry (followers) if the 
strength of the network externalities is sufficiently large (Proposition 2, p. 221). 
Subsequently, Kim (2002) considered a Stackelberg competition in a horizontally 
differentiated product market with network externalities and demonstrated the following. 
First, if products are homogeneous, the Stackelberg leader never has an incentive to invite 
entry regardless of the strength of the network externalities (Proposition 1, p.398). Second, 
for differentiated products, the Stackelberg leader (never) has an incentive to invite entry 
if the strength of the network externalities is small (large) (Proposition 2, p. 399, emphasis 
added). 
Following these studies, we reconsider the Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite 
entry into a market with network externalities. In analyzing this market, we need to 
consider the role of consumer expectations about network size. In particular, we examine 
the following cases: the case of passive (responsive) expectations where consumers form 
their expectations of network sizes before (after) firms decide their outputs. In other 
words, under passive expectations, firms (i.e., the leader and followers in a Stackelberg 
competition) determine their outputs given expectations. In contrast, under responsive 
expectations, firms can commit to their outputs, and thus, consumers believe the levels 
announced. In this case, the expected network sizes equal the actual outputs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a model 
of horizontally differentiated oligopolies with network externalities and derive a 
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Stackelberg equilibrium in the case of passive expectations. We then demonstrate that the 
Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite entry depends on the strength of the network 
externalities. In Section 3, we summarize the results and present some remaining issues, 




2. The Model 
 
2.1 Preliminary 
We consider an oligopoly model ( 1n   firms) in a horizontally differentiated products 
market with network externalities where firms compete in a quantity setting competition. 
Applying the frameworks of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we assume the 
following linear inverse demand function with network externalities for firm i’s product: 







, ,,,...,0, iinii             (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size, iq  is the output of firm i,  1,0  is the degree 
of product substitutability, and ( 1)n   is the number of firms in the market.  EiSF  is 
the network function where EiS  is an expected network size of firm i’s product.
1 The 
expected network size is given by: 
                                                 
1 In our model, the expected network size relates to total output in the market and not the 
number of consumers or users. For example, we assume that the expected network size 
















, , 0,..., , ,i i n i i                       (2) 
where  1,0   denotes the degree of product i’s compatibility with product –i. To 
simplify the analysis, hereafter, we assume perfect compatibility, i.e., .1  We also 
assume that a linear network function is given by:   ,E Ei iF S eS  where  0,1e  is the 
degree of network externalities. 
In the following analysis, we assume that firm 0 is a leader and firm j ( 1,..., ).n  is 
a follower. Using equations (1) and (2), we derive the following inverse demand function 
of follower j: 






















,   , 1,..., , .j j n j j     
Similarly, the inverse demand fucntion of leader 0 is given by: 








, ,,...,1 nj  ,00
E
j










, 1,..., .j n  
Furthermore, we assume that production costs are zero. This is because we observe 
low and even negligible marginal running costs in network industries, e.g., 
telecommunication and Internet businesses. 
Finally, following Economides (1996) and Kim (2002), we assume the case of free 
license (i.e., no charge on entry). Thus, the following profit functions of leader 0 and 
follower j are respectively given by:    000000 qSFQqAqp Ej     and 
 5
     ,0 jEjjjjjj qSFQqqAqp   1,..., .j n  
 
2.2 A fulfilled Stackelberg equilibrium under passive expectations 
Given the expected network sizes and the outputs of leader 0 and the other followers ,j  
follower j decides that output to maximize profit. The first-order condition (FOC) of profit 
maximization is given by: 










 1,..., .j n  
Thus, the reaction function of follower j is expressed as: 























                                         (5) 








q j  1,..., ,j n  
which implies strategic substitutes. 

















            
 1,..., ,j n  
Given symmetric followers, i.e., ,jj qq  ,,,...,1, jjnjj   the above equation can 
be rewritten as: 




A                             (6) 
In a fulfilled Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., ,00 L
E qqq   ,Fj
E
j qqq  ,,...,1 nj   
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where subscript L (F) denotes a leader (follower), equations (5) and (6) can be rewritten 
as: 












                                   (8) 














                                             (10) 
where   2 2(2 ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0.e n e n e n              2  Taking the FOCs for 
profit maximization, the prices of a leader and followers are expressed as: 




     
    
 and ,F Fp q  respectively. 
 
2.3 The entry effect: The Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite entry 
Before examining this problem, using equation (10), we derive the following effects of 







        








             
                      (12) 
                                                 
2 For the following analysis, we rewrite this as follows:
 2 22 (1 )( ) 2(2 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 ),e n e n e                  
where 1.n   
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where  4 (1 )( ) 2(2 ) (2 ) .d e n e
dn
              
We investigate the entry effect on the leader’s profit, i.e., .L L Lp q   In particular, 
we have 2( ) .L L L L L LL L
d dp dq q dp dq
q p n
dn dn dn dn dn
           
  Using equations (11) 
and (12), we derive the following relationship: 
 2 2( )0 (2 ) 2 ( ) ( )0







                 
  




3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
3 2
( ) ( ) 4 (1 ) 6 (1 )(2 ) 2 (2 ) (6 6 )
(2 ) 2(2 ) 2 (2 ) .
LH n e n n n
e
         
    
         
       
 
   In view of equation (13), we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1.  
If the degree of network externalities is sufficiently larger (smaller) than that of the 
product substitutability, an increase in entry increases (decreases) the leader’s profit. 
 
Proof.  

































 the entry effect depends on the number of firms. 
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   Proposition 1 implies that in a horizontally differentiated products market with 
sufficiently strong (weak) network externalities, the Stackelberg leader (i.e., the 
incumbent monopolist) will invite (deter) entry, by granting a free license (emphasis 
added). This lies opposite to Proposition 2 shown by Kim (2002). Furthermore, in the 
case of a homogeneous product market, i.e., ,1  it holds that .1 e  Accordingly, 
the Stackelberg leader never has an incentive to invite entry. This result is the same as 
Proposition 1 shown by Kim (2002). 
Furthermore, the entry effect on the follower’s profit, i.e.,  2 ,F Fq   is expressed 





       Taking equation (9), we derive the following 
relationship: 
 2( )0 2 (1 ) (2 ) ( )0







    


          
     
             (14) 
where  2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) 4 (1 ) 4 (1 )(2 ) 2(2 ) (2 ) .FH n e n n                    Thus, 
in view of equation (14), we summarize the result as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. 
If the degree of network externalities is sufficiently larger (smaller) than that of the 
product substitutability, an increase in entry increases (decreases) the follower’s profit. 
 
We address the implications of Propositions 1 and 2 as follows. The effects of an 
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increase in entry include a competitive effect through product substitutability and a 
network externalities effect. In view of equation (4), the former shifts the leader’s inverse 
demand function downward, i.e., the leader’s market-reduction effect, whereas the latter 
shifts it upward, i.e., the leader’s market-enlargement effect. In particular, the parameter 
   implies the marginal competitive effect and parameter e   the marginal network 
externalities effect. Thus, if the network externalities effect exceeds the competitive effect, 
an increase in entry increases the leader’s market and thus its profit, and vice versa. Based 
on equation (3), there is a similar effect on the follower’s profit. 




3. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we examined a problem previously considered by Economides (1996) and 
Kim (2002), i.e., a Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite entry assuming a horizontally 
differentiated oligopoly with network externalities. We demonstrated that a Stackelberg 
leader has (does not have) an incentive to invite entry if the degree of network 
externalities is sufficiently larger (smaller) than that of the product substitutability. In this 
case, a follower’s profit increases (decreases). 
In addition to the generalization of the specific assumptions in the model, e.g., linear 
inverse demand and network functions, perfect and symmetric compatibility, there are 
                                                 
3 Given equations (A.1) and (A.4), it is clear that if ( )e    an increase in entry 
increases (decreases) the profits of the leader and followers. 
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some remaining issues.4 For example, we should investigate whether the result depends 
on the mode of competition, i.e., the Stackelberg leader’s incentive to invite entry in the 
case of price competition. We have also not examined welfare effects. Relating to this, 
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4 In the case of responsive expectations, we demonstrate that Propositions 1 and 2 hold 
even with partial compatibility. 
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Appendix: The case of responsive expectations 
 
1. Stackelberg equilibrium 
We confirm whether the main results, i.e., Propositions 1 and 2, hold in the case of 
responsive expectations. From equation (3), it holds that ,00 qq
E  ,j
E
j qq    and 
,j
E
j QQ     .,,...,1, jjnjj    Thus, we derive the following inverse demand 
function of follower j: 
 ,)()1( 0 jjj QqeqeAp    .,,...,1, jjnjj          (A.1) 















 where ,jk   .,...,1,0 nk   This implies that .1 ee    
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 .,,...,1, jjnjj   
Assuming symmetric followers, i.e., ,jj qq  ,,,...,1, jjnjj   we obtain the 
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qj  Unlike the case 
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of passive expectations, the strategic relationship depends on the degree of network 
externalities and of product differentiation. 
   From equation (4), the inverse demand function for leader 0 is given by: 
.)()1( 00 jqenqeAp                                  (A.4) 







(1 ) ( )
( )
2(1 ) ( ) 0.
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        

      
   
         (A.5) 
In the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., lqq 0   and ,fj qq    where subscript l (f) 
denotes a leader (follower), equations (A.2) and (A.5) can be rewritten as: 





















            (A.7) 








                                            (A.8) 
2(2 ) 2( )(1 )
,
2{2 ( ) }f
e e n
q A
e e n D
  
 
    

   
                          (A.9) 
where (1 )(2 ) ( )(1 ) 0.D e e e n            Furthermore, the prices in the 
Stackelberg equilibrium can be represented as: ff qep )1(   and  
2
.
2(1 ) ( ) ( ) 2{2 ( ) }l l
D e
p q A
e e e n e e n

   
   
           
       (A.10) 
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2. The entry effect 
Based on equations (A.8) and (A.10), the entry effects on the output and price of the 
leader are given by: 
,)(0)(






l                      (A.11) 
( )0 ( ) .









     
   
                (A.12) 
Using equations (A.11) and (A.12), we derive the following entry effect on the profit 
of the leader: 











ll                       (A.13) 
Therefore, we confirm Proposition 1. 








dn e e n dn

 
         
                        (A.14) 
In view of equation (A.14), we derive the following relationships. 
(i) If e  then .0
dn





d f  
(ii) If e  then .0
dn








Therefore, we confirm Proposition 2. 
